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No More Business as Usual
Using Pension Activism to Protect Workers’ Rights 
Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein
Western Carolina University
Exporting jobs, reincorporating in off-shore tax havens, rewriting 
the bottom line, defrauding shareholders, polluting the environment, 
paying sky-rocketing executive compensation, and overinvesting 
401(k) assets in employer stock—it is all business as usual for U.S. 
corporations. But the international outcry that erupted after the stock 
market reached a five-year low post-Enron has caused organized labor 
to rally under the slogan “No more business as usual.” Corporate cam-
paigns aimed at law-evading corporations are becoming increasingly 
common. Shareholder proposals on corporate governance issues have 
proliferated, and activists have taken the drastic step of petitioning the 
State of California to revoke Unocal’s corporate charter. These actions, 
once seen as radical, are now being accepted by a public that has lost 
faith in the ability of corporations to restrain management greed.
This chapter will discuss the duties of pension fund trustees as uni-
versal owners, the role of trustees in ensuring corporate accountability, 
the potential of pension fund activism to encourage corporations to re-
spect workers’ rights to organize and bargain collectively, and the tac-
tics being used by pension fund activists to encourage good corporate 
citizenship.
UNIVERSAL OWNERS
Workers have over $10 trillion invested in their pension funds: $2.2 
trillion in defined contribution plans, $4.5 trillion in defined benefit 
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plans, $2.3 trillion in individual retirement accounts, and $1.2 trillion in 
annuities (Schneyer 2003). Of this amount, $302 billion is jointly man-
aged by workers and employers through Taft-Hartley funds (Jacobius 
2003)—collectively bargained funds which, under the Taft-Hartley Act, 
must be managed by equal employer and employee representatives. The 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has reported that stock ownership 
is concentrated among two groups: individuals and institutions. As of 
1998, individuals directly own 41.1 percent of U.S. corporate stock 
(NYSE 2000, Table 16). Institutional investors hold the remaining 58.9 
percent of corporate stock through mutual funds (16.3 percent), state 
and local government retirement plans (11.4 percent), defined contribu-
tion private pension funds (8.9 percent), defined benefit private pension 
plans (5.6 percent), banks (3.8 percent), life insurance companies (3.5 
percent), other institutional investors (2.2 percent) and foreign inves-
tors (7.2 percent) (NYSE 2000, Table 16).
As the owners of nearly 26 percent of U.S. equity (PR Newswire 
Association 2000), pension funds are in a position to influence corpo-
rate and public policy. The largest pension funds, such as TIAA-CREF, 
California Public Employees Retirement System, and New York City 
Employees’ Retirement System, hold such large concentrations of com-
pany stock that they cannot sell off stock of poorly performing or irre-
sponsible corporations without suffering a loss caused by their divest-
ment.  
The solution to this catch-22—that pension fund investors are too 
large to sell off poorly performing stock without taking a loss caused by 
their own sale—is the exercise of universal ownership rights. Hawley 
and Williams (2000, p. xv) describe the universal owner as “a large 
institutional investor that holds in its portfolio a broad cross section 
of the economy, holds its shares for the long term, and on the whole 
does not trade except to maintain its index.” Most large pension funds 
are universal owners: as long-term investors, they invest in diversified 
index funds and patiently hold on to corporate stock while meeting with 
corporate executives to encourage corporate reform. 
As permanent holders of a large segment of U.S. and foreign cor-
porations, pension funds must look beyond the financial performance 
of individual stock holdings to the performance of the economy as a 
whole. When a corporation dumps the cost of doing business onto an 
unsuspecting third party (called “externalities” in economic terms), the 
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universal owner has a stake in that third party and will suffer a loss. 
For example, the profit made by a pension fund that owns shares of a 
corporation that produces tobacco will be offset by significant increases 
in health care costs and decreases in worker productivity. Likewise, a 
pension fund that invests in corporations that engage in financial ma-
nipulation will suffer financially when the entire stock market declines 
because of loss of investor confidence in the efficiency of the markets. 
The cost of the externality is simply shifted to another entity owned by 
the pension fund. Thus, it is in the financial interest of a universal owner 
to support public policy initiatives that reward corporations who pay for 
the damage caused by their actions (i.e., corporations who internalize 
costs). Hawley and Williams (2000) observe that “a universal owner 
that really wants to maximize the shareholder value of its portfolio . . . 
need[s] to develop a public policy-like position and monitor regulatory 
developments and legislation on a number of key issues [important] 
to the economy as a whole (p. 170).” Such issues include the health 
and well-being of corporate employees, the impact of corporate actions 
on the ecology and the environment, respect for diversity and human 
rights, and the economic impact on the community in which the com-
pany operates (Grayson and Hodges 2002). The emphasis will thus shift 
from maximizing short-term profits to maximizing long-term value. 
THE ROLE OF PENSION FUND FIDUCIARIES
Pension fund trustees must act solely in the interest of plan par-
ticipants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of provid-
ing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries. (29 U.S.C. § 1104 
(a)(1)(A)).1 Trustees must also act prudently, that is, “with the care, 
skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing” 
that a prudent trustee would use (29 U.S.C.§1104 (a)(1)(B)). This pru-
dence rule extends to the trustees’ duty to vote on management and 
shareholder proposals in their capacity as stockholders. The U.S. De-
partment of Labor (USDOL) has stated that trustees have a fiduciary 
duty to vote on corporate proxy issues2 and actively monitor corpo-
rate management. (USDOL 1994). According to a 1988 letter from the 
USDOL to Helmuth Fandl, chairman of the retirement board of Avon 
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Products, Inc., a trustee should vote on proxies that may affect the value 
of stock held by the plan.
Where proxy voting decisions may have an effect on the value of a 
plan’s underlying investment, plan fiduciaries should make proxy vot-
ing decisions with a view to enhancing the value of the shares of stock, 
taking into account the period over which the plan expects to hold such 
shares. 
However, the trustee may not subordinate the interest of plan partic-
ipants to unrelated goals. A trustee may engage in shareholder activism 
if the trustee concludes that the activism is likely to “enhance the value 
of the plan’s investment in the corporation, after taking into account the 
costs involved” (USDOL 1994). Shareholder activism is particularly 
appropriate where a stock portfolio such as an index fund is being held 
on a long-term basis or where the plan cannot easily dispose of the 
stock without affecting the stock’s value (USDOL 1994). 
The USDOL suggests ways that trustees can engage in shareholder 
activism: by corresponding and meeting with corporate directors, vot-
ing on proxies, sponsoring shareholder proposals, and filing shareholder 
litigation. The purpose of the activism, however, must be to enhance the 
value of corporate stock held by the pension fund. Where the costs of 
activism outweigh the potential increase in shareholder value, activism 
should not be undertaken. It may be more appropriate, therefore, for a 
large public fund to engage in shareholder activism rather than a small 
welfare fund. 
EFFECTS OF CORPORATE CONDUCT ON STOCK PRICE
Studies have shown that corporate conduct, both positive and nega-
tive, has an effect on stock price. Such conclusions seem obvious in light 
of the stock market’s clear reaction to recent events such as Merck’s de-
ception about the safety of Vioxx, Safeway’s antiunion campaign, the 
collapse of Enron, the announcement of widespread corporate account-
ing fraud, the shredding of documents by Anderson, the bankruptcy fil-
ing of WorldCom, the indictment of Adelphia’s corporate officers, and 
the criminal indictment of Tyco’s chief executive. Likewise, the recent 
$9.8 million settlement against Dow Corning and the court’s decision to 
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permit a nationwide, punitive damage class-action lawsuit against the 
tobacco industry impact stock prices as corporations are forced to pay 
for their externalities. 
On the other hand, laudable conduct also affects share price over 
the long run.3 For example, Enterprise Rent-A-Car’s reputation was 
enhanced when, after September 11, it made an exception to its round-
trip requirement and allowed stranded airline travelers to rent cars to 
return home. Alexis Hocevar, vice president and general manager of an 
Enterprise regional office, said, “We knew we had to do the right thing 
and worry about the rest later” (Reichheld 2002). As a result, Enterprise 
suffered losses from displaced and stolen cars. But it decided to live its 
philosophy to “put customers first, and employees second, and profit 
will take care of itself” (Reichheld 2002).
According to a 2001 Hill & Knowlton survey, called “Corporate 
Citizen Watch,” “79 percent of Americans take corporate citizenship 
into account when deciding whether to buy a particular company’s 
product, with 36 percent considering it an important factor” (Business 
Wire 2001). The results are surprising, given that most Americans don’t 
appear to boycott products. The survey was conducted in Spring 2001 
and consisted of 2,594 people participating in an on-line interview. The 
survey also found that 71 percent consider corporate citizenship in their 
investment decisions. However, less than 2 percent of those surveyed 
believe that U.S. companies are excellent corporate citizens, and about 
25 percent believe corporations are “above average” citizens. Harlan 
Teller, executive vice president and director of Hill & Knowlton’s 
Worldwide Corporate Practice says, “There is no question that Ameri-
cans believe companies have a responsibility to their communities. But 
our survey findings suggest that corporations need to do more than sim-
ply give away dollars. They need to act in ways that are meaningful to 
their stakeholders—consumers, investors, employees, and members of 
the local community—and that genuinely demonstrate their core corpo-
rate values” (Business Wire 2001).
According to Hill & Knowlton’s “Corporate Reputation Watch 
2002” survey of more than 600 chief executive officers, 94 percent of 
CEOs believe corporate reputation is very important (Hill & Knowlton 
2002, p. 6). The survey found that CEOs rank the top three influences 
on corporate reputation as customers, employees, and the reputation 
of the CEO (Hill & Knowlton 2002, p. 8). CEOs of corporations with 
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revenues greater than $500 million are also strongly influenced by in-
dustry analysts, financial analysts, print media, and shareholders (Hill 
& Knowlton 2002, p. 25). CEOs of companies in the energy, utilities, 
financial services, and health care fields noted that they are strongly in-
fluenced by regulators. Overall, however, the responding CEOs ranked 
customers, employees, and CEO reputation as the top three motiva-
tors.
Empirical studies show that corporations on Fortune magazine’s 
annual list of most admired corporations are shrouded in a financial 
halo (Brown and Perry 1994; Black, Carnes, and Richardson 1999). 
Edvinsson and Malone (1997) note, “Somehow, if only by hunches 
and intuitions, the market is putting a value on invisible assets [such as 
reputation]. And some of these qualitative assets seem to hover in the 
ether almost indefinitely, converting to line items on the balance sheet 
years after the market has accounted for them.” Some researchers have 
verified that a correlation exists between high returns and good reputa-
tion (Black, Carnes, and Richardson 1999). Even though the financial 
literature does not unanimously conclude that good corporate citizen-
ship results in better firm performance, shareholders have seized this 
intuitive concept and are lobbying corporations to act responsibly. 
For example, shareholder activist Robert Monks has spearheaded 
the ExxonMobil Campaign, which charges that “ExxonMobil’s attitude 
toward climate change is fraught with ‘unneccessary risks and missed 
opportunities’ that could put at risk more than $100 billion in long-term 
shareholder value in the company” (Campaign ExxonMobil 2002). 
Monks, the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies and 
Campaign ExxonMobil commissioned a report entitled, Risking Share-
holder Value? ExxonMobil and Climate Change: An Investigation of 
Unnecessary Risks and Missed Opportunities (Campaign ExxonMo-
bil 2002). The report concludes that, “While ExxonMobil continues 
to gain respect in many quarters for its financials, it has also marched 
into a potential minefield of reputational risk, future shareholder losses, 
exposure to litigation, and policy costs on the issue of climate 
change . . . We find real and increasingly serious risks to sharehold-
ers that have arisen from the way ExxonMobil has stood out from the 
crowd and let itself become the obvious chief ‘climate change villain’ ” 
(Campaign ExxonMobil 2002, p. 4). The report provides justification 
for shareholders who wish to challenge ExxonMobil to act responsibly 
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on climate change issues so as to avoid a decline in share value because 
of reputational harm.
Human rights violations are also increasingly affecting multination-
al corporations’ reputations and shareholder value. For example, in 2002 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 11 Burmese villagers could 
sue Unocal for its complicity in forced labor, murder, rape, and torture 
at the company’s construction of a Burmese pipeline (Doe I v. Unocal 
Corp., 395 F. 3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), dismissed on reh. en banc, 403 F. 
3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005)). Paul Hoffman, the villagers’ attorney stated: 
“This decision is important not only because it allows a U.S. company 
to be held liable for abuses committed overseas, but also because it 
tells other multinational corporations that go into business with repres-
sive dictatorships that they are responsible if they assist their partners’ 
abuses” (Earthrights 2002). Co-counsel added: “This ruling puts the 
plaintiffs one step closer to having their day in court. We are confident 
that a jury reviewing the facts of this case will be horrified. We expect 
a huge verdict on their behalf” (Earthrights 2002). Such corporate con-
duct has an effect on the corporation’s reputation and its bottom line. 
Unocal settled the lawsuit three years later for an undisclosed amount, 
which is estimated to exceed $15 million.4 Katie Redford, a lawyer for 
Earthrights, announced “Companies have been able to mislead them-
selves and the public that human rights concerns would not affect their 
bottom line. That’s just not the case anymore” (Eviatar 2005).
TACTICS TO ENCOURAGE RESPONSIBLE  
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP
Richard Ferlauto, Director of Pension and Benefit Investment Poli-
cy with AFSCME, has developed a continuum of pension fund activism 
(Table 14.1). We will look at the various tactics along this continuum, 
starting with the most passive and proceeding to the most aggressive 
tactics.




Trustees who  
focus on corporate 
governance issues
Trustees who encourage 
corporate accountability Pension fund activists
No effort to comply 
with fiduciary standards 
relating to proxy voting
Votes in support of 
management proposals
Drafts and adopts own 
proxy voting guidelines
Adopts principles such 
as the CERES and 
McBride principlesa
Engages corporate 
directors in a dialog 
about corporate 
governance issues
Has not adopted proxy 
voting guidelines
Votes for management 
slate of directors
Monitors executive pay Encourages corporations 
to comply with basic 
workplace standards 
such as ILO standards
Sponsors shareholder 
proposals
Uses policy guidelines 




Considers social impact 
of board decisions













Uses litigation to remedy 
unlawful corporate 
conduct
Does not monitor proxy 
voting by professionals
Encourages pay for 
performance
Works toward legislative 
reform on corporate 
accountability and 
financial transparency
Table 14.1  Continuum of Pension Fund Activism
a The CERES Principles were created by the Coalition of Environmentally Responsible Economies, a group of investors and environmental 
activists. Corporations may endorse these principles to show their commitment to environmental protection, including emissions reduction, 
environmental restoration, environmental sustainability, and responsible waste reduction. The principles can be found at http://www.
ceres.org/coalitionandcompanies/principles.php. The McBride Principles are a code of corporate conduct designed to prevent religious 
discrimination by employers in Northern Ireland. Many pension funds have adopted investment policies that prohibit investment in a 
corporation that does business in Northern Ireland unless the corporation has adopted the McBride Principles.
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Silence of the Funds
The right to vote proxies is a plan asset. In Interpretive Bulletin 
94-2, USDOL stated that trustees have a fiduciary duty to develop 
proxy voting guidelines and vote in accordance with those guidelines 
on proxy issues that are likely to have a financial impact on shares held 
by the pension fund. Common examples of proposals that affect stock 
value include reincorporation,5 poison pills,6 antitakeover devices,7 
and greenmail8,9 (Securities and Exchange Commission 1984, 1985; 
Pound 1987, p. 362). Since most shareholder and management propos-
als would likely affect stock value if adopted, a strong argument can be 
made that trustees must vote on all proxies, or must delegate their au-
thority to vote to investment professionals who will vote on the proxies 
in accordance with the fund’s guidelines. 
Many trustees delegate this activity to mutual funds that consis-
tently vote with management but refuse to disclose their vote.10 Van-
guard Group founder John Bogle calls this phenomenon “Silence of the 
Funds” (Brown 2002). For example, mutual fund Fidelity Investments 
is the largest institutional holder of Nabors Industries and holds over 
$537 million (10.55 percent) of Nabors’ shares. Fidelity also holds 7.6 
percent (over $266 million) of Stanley Works and 5.33 percent ($1.4 
billion) of Tyco International. These corporations held votes on reincor-
porating in Bermuda to avoid U.S. taxes. Tyco and Nabors have already 
reincorporated in Bermuda, as did Fidelity in the 1960s. In that 1988 
letter to Helmuth Fandl, chairman of the retirement board of Avon, the 
USDOL clearly stated that trustees have a duty to vote on reincorpora-
tion issues. Yet, until recently it appears that not only has Fidelity voted 
in support of management and against the interests of shareholders, but 
it has refused to inform the shareholders of the nature of its vote (AFL-
CIO 2002).
Fidelity, which manages assets of $859.8 billion, or 12.5 percent 
of the market share (AFL-CIO 2002), excuses its conduct by saying 
that disclosure of proxy voting guidelines and votes could impact the 
company’s stock price. That’s precisely the point that pension activists 
have been making, and it is the basis for the USDOL’s mandate that 
trustees vote on proxies that may affect stock value. Instead, Fidelity 
used this argument to support its refusal to disclose its proxy voting 
records to the beneficial owner of the stock. Fidelity said that its voting 
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records are “proprietary information” and thus, not disclosable (Lau-
ricella and Schroeder 2002). Fidelity’s argument, however, flies in the 
face of USDOL’s Interpretive Bulletin, which implies that delegation 
of proxy voting authority without monitoring to make sure the proxy is 
voted in such a manner as to increase shareholder value is a breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
Investment managers and mutual fund managers such as Fidelity 
often face a conflict of interest in voting proxies. Fidelity has 9,600 cli-
ents and manages 7.8 million 401(k) accounts (Kirchhoff 2002). As the 
largest provider of 401(k) plans, Fidelity has an incentive to vote with 
management so that management will continue to offer Fidelity as one 
of their 401(k) vendors (AFL-CIO 2002). Reporter Steven Syre calls Fi-
delity the “ultimate fund management fee machine” (Syre 2002). Fees 
for Fidelity’s largest mutual fund alone totaled $556.3 million in 2001 
(Syre 2002). According to Mercer Bullard, founder of Fund Democ-
racy, mutual funds “serve two masters” and “may avoid taking a stand 
against company management for fear of losing pension plan business” 
(Friedman 2002; Day 2002). At the urging of the AFL-CIO, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission voted to require mutual fund managers 
to disclose publicly how they cast proxy votes on behalf of their inves-
tors (Securities and Exchange Commission 2003). In September 2004, 
the AFL-CIO released a report entitled, Behind the Curtain: How the 
10 Largest Mutual Fund Families Voted when Presented with 12 Op-
portunities to Curb CEO Pay Abuse in 2004. According to the report, 
Fidelity ranked 9th out of 10 in the survey, voting to curb CEO pay only 
25 percent of the time (AFL-CIO 2004).
Meeting with Management
Not only does USDOL believe that trustees must vote proxies, it has 
stated that trustees should meet with management on corporate gover-
nance issues whenever “the responsible fiduciary concludes that there is 
a reasonable expectation that such monitoring or communication with 
management, by the plan alone or together with other shareholders, is 
likely to enhance the value of the plan’s investment in the corporation, 
after taking into account the costs involved” (USDOL 1994). USDOL 
acknowledges that where a pension fund is a long-term investor in an 
index fund, “the prudent exercise of proxy voting rights or other forms 
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of corporate monitoring or communication may be the only method 
available for attempting to enhance the value of the portfolio” (USDOL 
1994). Other issues that USDOL considers appropriate topics of con-
versation with management include “the appropriateness of executive 
compensation, the corporation’s policy regarding mergers and acquisi-
tions, the extent of debt financing and capitalization, the nature of long-
term business plans, the corporation’s investment in training to develop 
its work force, other workplace practices, and financial and non-finan-
cial measures of corporate performance” (USDOL 1994). Workplace 
practices would include the corporation’s attitude toward unionization.
Management meetings work. For example, in the 2003 proxy sea-
son, pension funds and unions negotiated settlement of shareholder 
resolutions with 105 corporations. Thirty-one corporations, including 
Halliburton, Caterpillar, and Reebok, negotiated agreements on expens-
ing stock options. Although a small number, it is quite remarkable that 
in light of the AFL-CIO/AFSCME/CalPERS “Come Home to Ameri-
ca” campaign, three corporations (Transocean, Schlumberger, and Mc-
Dermott) agreed to discuss reincorporation in the United States. Seven 
leading underwriting firms including J.P. Morgan & Chase, Goldman 
Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers, and Citigroup 
agreed to analyst independence. And because shareholder votes are not 
binding, two corporations agreed, at the request of NYCERS, to adopt 
proposals supported by majority vote. The AFL-CIO reached agree-
ment with four corporations on chairman independence. Twenty-three 
corporations settled shareholder resolutions requesting performance-
based options (Georgeson 2003; Investor Responsibility Research Cor-
poration 2003). 
While fund-sponsored corporate governance proposals frequently 
pass, the success rate for social proposals is infrequent. A common 
shareholder proposal calls for the targeted corporation to adopt Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO) standards:
•  RESOLVED: The shareholders request that the board of direc-
tors of the Coca-Cola Company . . . adopt an enforceable policy 
to be followed by the company, its subsidiaries, bottlers, and 
distributors with respect to operations in Columbia, said policy 
to be based on ILO’s declaration on fundamental principles and 
rights at work and to include the following:
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• All workers have the right to form and join trade unions and bar-
gain collectively (Conventions 87 and 98).
• There shall be no discrimination or intimidation in employment 
. . . (Conventions 100 and 111).
• Employment shall be freely chosen. There shall be no use of 
forced, including bonded or voluntary prison, labor or of child 
labor (Conventions 29 and 105, 138 and 182) (Coca-Cola Com-
pany 2003). 
In the 2003 proxy season, unions and funds filed shareholder pro-
posals at seven companies, calling for adherence to the ILO standards. 
Agreements were reached at Sears and Unocal. Although the other pro-
posals did not pass, the resolution at Hudson’s Bay received a stunning 
36.8 percent.
Perhaps the most important event in the 2003 proxy season occurred 
in May 2003, when competing slates of directors for El Paso, an energy 
company that provides natural gas and other energy-related products, 
met with pension fund investment managers at the headquarters of the 
AFL-CIO to explain their corporate philosophy and long-term corporate 
goals. As a result of the meeting, pension funds endorsed the competing 
slate of directors. The insurgents lost by a narrow margin and tabulators 
recounted the vote (Perin 2003). Even though the final tally declared 
the incumbents victors, the pension fund shareholders were truly the 
victors since they garnered enough votes to make them influential in 
the shareholder vote.
Using Pension Fund Activism to Encourage Organizing
The most common tactic pension fund activists use to create union 
jobs is the Responsible Contractor Policy. The Service Employees In-
ternational Union (SEIU), CalPERS, and the New York State Common 
Retirement Fund have adopted Responsible Contractor Policies which 
require all fund real estate holdings, loans, or maintenance contracts, 
to contain an agreement that all work performed on the fund property 
will be done in accordance with all applicable labor laws. As the SEIU 
policy puts it, 
[i]n order to ensure a competitive return on its real estate invest-
ments, the Fund seeks to invest in properties that are well-run and 
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maintained where tenants receive high quality services . . . Assur-
ing the availability of a qualified staff and avoiding labor disrup-
tion and costly employee turnover requires employers to pay fair 
and reasonable compensation, to treat workers fairly and abide by 
applicable labor laws. (SEIU 1998) 
Similarly, the New York Common Retirement Fund has a contrac-
tor selection program that emphasizes the fund’s “deep interest in the 
condition of workers employed by the fund and its advisors” (New York 
Common Retirement Fund 1998). The policy requires investment man-
agers to hire program contractors who pay “workers a fair wage and 
a fair benefit as evidenced by payroll and employee records, and who 
compl[y] with the fund’s minority and women business policy” (New 
York Common Retirement Fund 1998). Although these policies do 
not literally require union representation of building and maintenance 
workers, they have had this effect. 
Responsible contractor policies give hiring preferences to employ-
ers who pay their workers a fair wage and provide employer-paid health 
insurance, pension benefits, and training opportunities. By adopting a 
responsible contractor policy, pension funds can meet their fiduciary 
duty to achieve a competitive rate of return while ensuring the fair treat-
ment of employees working on their properties. 
Building trade unions use another tactic: they buy raw land, build 
the project union, and sell the property with a responsible contractor 
clause. This tactic is not limited to the building trade unions, however, 
because pooled real estate funds such as the AFL-CIO Housing Invest-
ment Trust (HIT) and Building Investment Trust (BIT) accomplish the 
same result by offering commingled funds that guarantee union work. 
During the 10-year period from 1993–2003, BIT has generated over 11 
million hours of union construction as well as union jobs for the mem-
bers of 17 AFL-CIO unions in the construction, servicing, and mainte-
nance of properties. As of March 31, 2003, BIT’s net assets exceeded 
$1.5 billion and were invested in nearly 12 million square feet of com-
mercial development in the communities where union members live 
and work (HIT 2003). 
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Sponsoring Shareholder Proposals
The USDOL also encourages trustees to sponsor shareholder pro-
posals where the proposal may affect the corporation’s stock value (US-
DOL 1994). In the 2003 proxy season, trustees of pension funds and 
union representatives filed approximately 381 shareholder proposals, 
more than double the proposals filed in 2002. Sixty-nine labor-spon-
sored proposals passed and settlements were reached on 105 proposals. 
The AFL-CIO won majority support for its resolutions on executive 
pensions at U.S. Bancorp (52 percent), golden parachutes11 at Alcoa 
(65 percent), and shareholder approval of severance plans at Tyco (57.7 
percent). Although its proposal at United Technologies only garnered 47 
percent of the vote, the company agreed to review its policy on golden 
parachutes. The Culinary Workers scored big at The Cheesecake Fac-
tory, winning proposals to submit stock option plans12 to shareholder 
vote (66 percent), require annual election of directors (72 percent), sub-
mit a poison pill to shareholder vote (67 percent), and eliminate the 80 
percent supermajority voting requirement13 (81 percent). The Teamsters 
won stock option expensing14 proposals at Coke Enterprises, PPG In-
dustries, and Weyerhauser, and the Carpenters won 78 percent support 
for a similar resolution at Exxon Mobil. AFSCME settled a proposal on 
golden parachutes at Electronic Data Systems. Other victories include 
BellTel Retirees’ proposal for shareholder approval of severance plans 
at Verizon (59 percent) and Connecticut Retirement Plans’ proposal to 
declassify the board at Reebok (63 percent) and Stanley (55 percent). 
Certainly, it was a successful year for shareholder activists.
Table 14.2 lists pension fund and related shareholder proposals that 
passed in 2003. This table may understate the funds’ success rate be-
cause it does not include the 105 resolutions that corporations agreed 
to in principle and, therefore, were withdrawn. Also, fund-sponsored 
shareholder proposals at 35 corporations that did not pass received 
votes in excess of a third of shareholders (a stunning amount, especially 
for first-time proposals). 
Encouraging Legislative Reform
Pension funds have been among the prime movers in the fight to 
enact legislation that addresses corporate accountability and transpar-
No More Business as Usual   319
ency. For example, as part of its legislative agenda, CalPERS will do 
the following: 
1)  Actively oppose the election of any director who, while sit-
ting on the company’s audit committee, approved retaining an 
external audit firm when that firm also provides consulting or 
internal audit services to a company.
 2) Publicly oppose shareholder approval of any auditor that has 
been retained by the company for more than five years, or also 
performs consulting or internal audit services to the company. 
CalPERS believes that current moves by the accounting indus-
try to separate their consulting relationships from their audit-
ing relationships is too late and too narrowly defined to accom-
plish the overall goal of restoring confidence in the industry.
 3) Join forces with other significant users of financial statements 
to provide concrete and responsible proposals for account-
ing standards reform to Congress, the Securities & Exchange 
Commission, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the 
International Accounting Standards Board and the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
 4) Form a commission made up of regulators, legislative repre-
sentatives, and investors to examine ways in which conflicts 
of interests (by investment banks, equity analysts, rating agen-
cies, lending institutions, outside attorneys and other consul-
tants) can be identified, disclosed and managed.
 5) Immediately prepare, promote, and pursue proposals within 
Congress, the SEC and Exchanges that truly strengthen and 
clarify the meaning and importance of an “independent” direc-
tor (CalPERS 2002b).
Many of CalPERS’ legislative proposals were adopted as part of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (CalPERS 2002a).
Shareholder Litigation
In conventional shareholder litigation, the plaintiff typically claims 
that the corporate issuer violated federal securities law by engaging 
in fraud with respect to SEC filings. For example, CalPERS, the Cali-
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Company Proposal Sponsor Vote
AK Steel Approval of severance Longview Fund 59.2
Alcoa, Inc. Approval of severance AFL-CIO 64.7
Apple Computer Expense stock options UBC 56.4
Arden Realty Submit poison pill to 
shareholder (SH) vote
SEIU 83.0
Avon Industries Expense stock options IBEW 56.4
Black & Decker Expense stock options UBC 52.0
Boston Scientific Performance-based exec. 
comp.
Sheet metal workers 90.1
Capital One 
Financial
Expense stock options UBC 55.0
Calpine Repeal classified board IBEW 62.8
Calpine Submit poison pill to SH 
vote
Plumbers, Pipefitters 66.3
CenterPoint Energy Performance-based exec. 
comp.
Sheet metal workers 75.5
The Cheesecake 
Factory





Annual election of directors Culinary workers 62.0
The Cheesecake 
Factory





Eliminate supermajority vote Culinary workers 69.6
Circuit City Stores Submit poison pill to SH 
vote
AFSCME 79.3
Citrix Systems Expense stock options LIUNA 54.8
Coke Enterprises Expense stock options IBT Majority
Covance Declassify board NYCERS 72.3
Crescent Real 
Estate Equities
Declassify board SEIU 72.7
Delta Airlines Expense stock options Delta pilots 61.4
Delta Airlines Approval of severance Delta pilots 54.3
Eastman Kodak Expense stock options LIUNA 56.3
Table 14.2  Pension Fund and Related Shareholder Proposals That 
Passed in 2003 as of November 14, 2003, Tally
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Company Proposal Sponsor Vote
Equifax Expense stock options UBC 60.7
Exxon Mobil Expense stock options UBC 78.0
Fluor Expense stock options UBC 79.7
Genzyme Corp. Expense stock options UBC 63.2
Georgia Pacific Expense stock options IBT General Fund 65.0
Hercules Authorize written consent NYC Firefighters 63.1
Hewlett-Packard Approval of severance SEIU 52.4
International Paper Approval of severance AFL-CIO 61.0
Kilroy Realty Submit poison pill to SH 
vote
SEIU 87.1
Kimberly-Clark Expense stock options UBC 53.0
Kohl’s Expense stock options UBC 50.6
Lowe’s Submit poison pill to SH 
vote
BAC 70.2
Manor Care Declassify board NYC Firefighters 71.8
Massey Energy Approval of severance Longview Fund 72.5
MBNA Expense stock options AFSCME 52.1
McKesson Approval of severance IBT 68.1
Mercury Interactive Expense stock options UBC 52.3
Mirant Expense stock options IBEW 61.7
NCR Expense stock options LIUNA 53.2
J.C. Penney Expense stock options LIUNA 52.0
Office Depot Submit poison pill to SH 
vote
BAC 78.7
PPG Expense stock options IBT General Fund 52.4





Expense stock options SMWIA 54.5
Raytheon Approval of severance AFL-CIO 66.4
Reebok Declassify board Connecticut 
Retirement Plans
63.0
RyderSystems Submit poison pill to SH 
vote
AFSCME 76.6
Safeway Expense stock options Plumbers, Pipefitters 62.7
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Company Proposal Sponsor Vote
Safeway Declassify board Longview Fund 61.0
Sprint Approval of severance Longview Fund 63.7
Stanley Works Declassify board Connecticut 
Retirement Plans
55.0
Starwood Hotels Expense stock options IBEW 60.5
Supervalu Expense stock options UBC 64.3
Tellabs Declassify board Longview Fund 68.3
Thermo Electron Expense stock options SMWIA 59.7
Tyco International Approval of severance AFL-CIO 57.7
U.S. Bancorp Executive pensions AFL-CIO 51.6
U.S. Bancorp Expense stock options UBC 59.9
Union Pacific Approval of severance Longview Fund 56.8
United Technologies Approval of severance AFL-CIO 54.0
Veritas Software Expense stock options Plumbers, Pipefitters 64.3
Verizon Approval of severance BellTel Retirees, Inc. 59.0
VF Declassify board Longview Fund 56.7
Wells Fargo Abolish stock option AFL-CIO 56.3
Weyerhauser Expense stock options Teamsters 50.0
Whole Food 
Markets
Declassify board Longview Fund 60.5
Yahoo! Submit poison pill to SH 
vote
Longview Fund 56.2
Table 14.2  (continued)
NOTE: AFL-CIO = American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions; AFSCME = American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees; 
BAC = Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers; IBEW= International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers; IBT = International Brotherhood of Teamsters; LIUNA= Labor-
ers’ International Union of North America; NYCERS = New York City Employees’ 
Retirement System; SEIU = Service Employees International Union; SMWIA = Sheet 
Metal Workers International Association; UBC = United Brotherhood of Carpenters 
and Joiners of America.
SOURCE: Compiled from various sources including Georgeson Shareholder, Annual 
Corporate Governance Review: Shareholder Proposals and Proxy Contests (2002) 
and Investor Responsibility Corporation 2003 Vote Results. This table was originally 
published in Zanglein and Clark (2004).
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fornia Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS), and the Los Angeles 
County Employees Retirement Association recently sued WorldCom 
for losses exceeding $300 million with respect to fraudulent statements 
made in the prospectus issued for the sale of corporate bonds in May 
2001 (CalPERS 2002c). Likewise, the law firm of Milberg Weiss, a 
class-action specialist, filed a class-action lawsuit against Enron seek-
ing to recover losses relating to Enron’s fraudulent statements.
An example of an innovative use of securities litigation can be found 
in the action brought against Phelps Dodge by the Steelworkers. The 
lawsuit, filed during impasse of the union’s collective bargaining agree-
ment, alleged that Phelps Dodge violated federal securities laws when 
it understated environmental liability in its reports to shareholders. (In 
re Phelps Dodge, Inc., SEC File No. 001-00082 (undated circa 1998)). 
ICEM General Secretary Vic Thorpe stated “Phelps Dodge has contin-
ued to show its disdain for its stakeholders. It’s time they realize that 
bad corporate behavior is bad for business.”15 At the company’s annual 
shareholder meeting USWA President Leo Girard said, “Phelps Dodge’s 
environmental clean-up obligations hang like a sword of Damocles 
over the investing public.”16 While the lawsuit was later dropped, it did 
influence other groups to propose expanded environmental and social 
disclosure requirements to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Revocation of Corporate Charters
Perhaps the most aggressive action taken against a corporation is 
the attempted revocation of Unocal’s corporate charter. In 1998, Rob-
ert Benson, on behalf of the National Lawyers Guild, filed a petition 
with the Attorney General for the State of California to revoke Unocal’s 
charter. Petitioners contended that the charter should be revoked be-
cause, among other things, Unocal
• has been identified as a potentially responsible party at 82 “Su-
perfund” or similar toxic sites;
• has committed hundreds of Occupational Safety and Health Act 
violations in the last 12 years; 
• has treated U.S. workers unethically and unfairly; and
• carries on ventures with foreign business partners in a fashion 
that makes the company complicit in and legally liable for their 
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partners’ unspeakable human rights violations against women, 
gays, laborers, villagers, ethnic minorities, and indigenous peo-
ple (Benson 1999).
While the petition has been unsuccessful, it has heightened public 
awareness that a corporate charter is granted by the state and can be 
revoked by the state. It has also increased political pressure on Unocal, 
which has been targeted by activists for its human rights violations in 
Burma. 
CONCLUSION
In the 12 years since the USDOL issued Interpretive Bulletin 94-2 
encouraging pension funds to become shareholder activists, many trust-
ees have taken the lead. However, far more trustees are lagging behind 
because they have neither the resources nor the education to implement 
these strategies. Additionally, most plans do not have worker represen-
tatives who can promote these issues.17
Trustees should take comfort in the fact that the USDOL has encour-
aged shareholder activism and has stated that trustees are not required 
to take the “quick buck” but may base their decisions on the long-term 
best interests of the corporation. Trustees can use this statement in sup-
port of their increased demands for corporate accountability. In addi-
tion, trustees should take advantage of the public’s current demand for 
corporate transparency and accountability to compel directors to adopt 
measures that will increase the long-term value of the corporation. 
In a 1999 survey of the most respected companies, CEOs listed “in-
creased pressure from stakeholder groups” as the second most impor-
tant upcoming business challenge (Grayson and Hodges 2002, p. 74). 
Corporations are facing increased attention in the form of shareholder 
resolutions, and pressure from institutional investors, nongovernmental 
organizations, regulatory agencies, consumers, and the public (Grayson 
and Hodges 2002, pp. 217–218). As one author put it, “Customers and 
employees care. That means the equity markets care. And that means 
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CEOs care” (Grayson and Hodges 2002, p. 78). And if they don’t care, 
pension trustees and activists can motivate them through tactics such as 
shareholder resolutions, corporate dialogue, corporate campaigns, and 
litigation.
Notes
Portions of this chapter are adapted, with permission, from Zanglein and Clark (2004).
 1.  Although public funds are excluded from ERISA coverage, these standards are 
still applicable as they are contained in the Internal Revenue Code, the Uniform 
Management of Public Employees Retirement System Act, and state laws, which 
incorporate these duties.
 2.  Trustees may delegate their proxy voting authority, but if they do, the trustees 
should adopt proxy voting policies for their investment managers to follow and 
must monitor the managers’ votes.
 3.  Interbrand, a research company, estimates that 96 percent of Coca-Cola’s stock 
value is in intangibles such as reputation, knowledge, and brand. Kellogg’s stock 
value is 97 percent in intangibles, American Express 84 percent, and IBM 83 
percent. Rita Clifton, CEO of Interbrand, says “Brand equity is now a key as-
set.” Brand alone, accounts for 59 percent of Coke’s stock value, 64 percent of 
McDonald’s, and 61 percent of Disney’s value (Grayson and Hodges 2002).
 4.  Unocal sued its reinsurer for reimbursement for claims in excess of $15 million, 
leading experts to conclude that Unocal’s costs were significantly higher than 
$15 million (Eviatar 2005).
 5.  By reincorporating, a corporation chooses to reincorporate in another state or 
country (most notably the Bahamas or the Cayman Islands) that has less restric-
tive corporate laws and lower (or nonexistent) corporate taxes.
 6.  Poison pills are shares issued to current shareholders at extremely low prices to 
encourage shareholders to buy the new shares, with the result that the raider must 
buy more shares at a higher price. 
 7.  Antitakeover devices are charter and bylaw amendments that make it more dif-
ficult for a corporation to be taken over.
 8.  Greenmail is money paid to a corporate raider to “go away.” 
 9. Letter from the Department of Labor to Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Retire-
ment Board of Avon Products, Inc. February 23, 1988.
 10.  Letter from Harvey Pitt, Chair, Securities and Exchange Commission to John 
Higgins, President of Ram Trust Services. Feb. 12, 2002.
 11.  Golden parachutes are severance payments made to management employees on 
termination or change of control and are designed to “soften the landing” by 
providing gold. 
 12.  Stock option plans are generally provided to upper management and grant the 
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employee the right to buy company stock at a stated exercise price. In the event 
the stock price rises, the employee can profit by purchasing stock at the lower 
exercise price. Stock options are subject to abuse when the board of directors 
agree to reprice the stock options so that the executives can profit even when the 
corporation is not profiting.
 13.  Supermajority voting requirements are usually placed on changes of corporate 
control such as mergers and acquisitions. 
 14.  Funds have been lobbying corporations to expense stock options as this requires 
the corporation to include the costs of issuing stock options in their financial 
reports.
 15.  “Showdown at Phelps Dodge.” Available at http://www.icemna.org/ephelps3.
htm (accessed December 1999).
 16.  See note 14.
 17.  Legislative proposals, such as the Visclosky bill, H.R. 323 (108th Congress) 
which would provide joint trusteeship for single employer plans, would signifi-
cantly enhance the ability of workers to become pension activists and push for 
policies such as responsible contractor policies.
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